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Gould: The 1994-'95 Baseball Strike and National Labor Relations Board:

THE 1994-'95 BASEBALL STRIKE AND NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: TO THE PRECIPICE
AND BACK AGAIN'

William B. Gould IV
In a series of strikes and lockouts commencing in 1972, baseball labor
and management engaged in what came to be regarded as a near thirty-year
war!2 In 1994, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was at the center of
what would become the mother of all Major League Baseball disputes. This did
not constitute the first involvement of the Board inasmuch as it had issued a
complaint and unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an injunction against the owners in 1981. That petition had been rejected by federal district court.3 That
time, the NLRB case went nowhere as the parties labored onward for more than
eighty days until the owners' strike-insurance fund was exhausted. This time
around the NLRB obtained the injunction, and, in so doing, it brought the players back to the field and ultimately produced a collective bargaining agreement.
This time around I was to be Chairman of the NLRB, one of the alphabet agencies created during the Roosevelt New Deal, a five-member administrative agency which possesses quasi-judicial authority and responsibility. I had
been nominated by President Bill Clinton on June 28, 1993, and after a nine
month delay I was confirmed by a vote of 58-38 on March 2, 1994. In those
nine months, my writings in support of the National Labor Relations Act (which
the NLRB interprets and administers) were debated and attacked by many on
the conservative side of politics. My confirmation obtained the greatest number
of "no" votes of any Clinton nominee through that date, more than a year into
the Clinton Presidency. But the price of my confirmation was acceptance of a
right-wing, Republican, conservative board member who was to be a thorn in
my side during my NLRB tenure, and who was to cause me considerable problems in the resolution of the baseball dispute itself. Although they were still not
in a majority-that was yet to come in the 1994 fall elections-Republicans in
the Congress had considerable leverage. Senator Edward Kennedy wrote me
the day after my confirmation, "It's a good thing the Republicans decided not to
I
This article is based on Chapter Six of WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW,
POLITICS AND THE NLRB, A MEMOIR (2000), and on the author's forthcoming book, BASEBALL:
BRAWLS, STRIKES & DRUGS INAN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TURMOIL (2009). William B. Gould IV is
the Charles S. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus at the Stanford University Law School.
2
William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in ProfessionalSports: Reflections on Baseball,Labor,
andAnti-TrustLaw, 15, STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 61 (2004).
3
Silverman v. Major League Baseball, 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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filibuster! ' 4 They had the votes to do it, i.e., to resist the sixty votes which are a
prerequisite for cloture and thus shut off debate and have a vote!
Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the ranking Republican minority leader on
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, had interviewed all potential
Republican nominees by asking them this question: "If Chairman Gould is in
the majority in a policy case of consequence, will you dissent from his position?" A number of individuals could not give that guarantee because, quite
obviously, they could not foresee the cases that would come before us and what
our respective positions would be in advance of their resolution. Those who
regarded this kind of pledge as inconsistent with the independence that is inherent in the NLRB's quasi-judicial process did not make the cut. Only those aspirants who answered the question affirmatively could be supported by the Republicans, most of whose representatives in Congress would not have voted for the
National Labor Relations Act and its promotion of collective bargaining itselfi
This was then the environment for the baseball dispute which was to emerge
during my tenure as NLRB Chairman, and it helps explain the sharp and vigorous dissents rendered against our majority opinion in that case (as well as some
other policy cases). These dissents were frequently cited by both the Republicans in the Congress and, in this case, the baseball owners, as evidence for the
proposition that the NLRB was not impartial.
Again, the Board was immediately involved in a number of policy issues, and baseball was only one of them, albeit the most visible dispute that we
handled while I was in Washington! Before departing from Stanford for the
nation's capitol, I had told the late Leonard Koppett, my good friend and coteacher at Stanford Law School, that my deepest regret in taking the NLRB job
was giving up my baseball salary arbitrations. In '92-'93 I had arbitrated a series of cases involving then California Angels' outfielder Luis Polonia, as well
as Oakland A's utility infielder Jerry Browne (often referred to as the Governor), Dale Sveum utility infielder of the Philadelphia Phillies, and the San Diego
Padres' ace starter Andy Benes.
My answering machine told me that my hearing involving Atlanta
Braves' pitcher John Smoltz was cancelled as my plane came to a halt on Chicago O'Hare's Airport runway just as a the parties reached a settlement. Benes
was the only one of the above-mentioned foursome whose position I favored.
But this award had radiations beyond Benes and the Padres, and appeared to
affect the Smoltz settlement as well as that of Kevin Tapani of the Minnesota
Twins. Some of the owners pilloried the Benes award. For instance, the Los
Angeles Dodgers maintained that they had to enter into a similar settlement with
their then ace Ramon Martinez because he had a better "won and lost" record
than Benes, ignoring my view expressed at the Benes hearing that "won and
lost" records are frequently deceptive as a measure of a pitcher's worth because
4
Letter from Edward Kennedy, Senator, United States. Senate (March 3, 2004) (on file with
author).
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of the poor hitting, fielding, and bullpen which may surround the pitcher.
(Benes had not pitched for many winning Padres' teams at that time and, in my
opinion, was a classic illustration of this point.)
But I had enjoyed these cases and thus expressed to Koppett my deepest
regret that I would be giving them up for the NLRB. But, replied Leonard,
"You'll be more involved now than you ever were in the past. A big conflict is
coming between the parties, and the National Labor Relations Board will be
right in the middle of it. You'll see." Truer words were never spoken.
I was confirmed by the Senate as baseball negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were proceeding. As late as June of 1994 there was
little talk of a strike, although Murray Chass of the New York Times reported
that a strike threat for August was materializing. Yet, he noted, "in ownership
circles there is talk of gloom and doom but not because of the threat of a strike.
believe
The atmosphere is bleak because owners of a sizable number of teams
5
covet.",
they
cap
salary
the
get
don't
they
if
doom
financial
face
they
As in '81, '85, and '90, when labor disputes followed the 1976 agreement which had provided abiding standards for free agency in the wake of Peter
Seitz's 1975 award, the owners expressed a firm intention to change the status
quo by altering the mechanisms that allowed players to obtain substantial salary
increases. It seemed clear that the owners' advocacy of a salary cap would be
the major issue in the 1994 negotiations. Some of the owners believed that the
players would not strike because they would not want to relinquish their very
large salaries. (This view had been manifested earlier at the time of the '72
strike and again in '81 and thereafter!) Directly related to this was the view,
held by many, that if there was a strike and the strikers saw replacement players
taking the field, the picket lines would quickly dissolve and the players would
return on the owners' terms. In the previous negotiations, the lawful replacement tactic-the United States Supreme Court had said in 1938 that strikers
may be permanently replaced 6 (apparently, the owners were only thinking of
temporary replacements which are also lawfulT)-had not been utilized. This
time, reasoned the owners, it would be different. This time around they were
unified!
Thus, in the earlier disputes the owners had conceded that the strike
brought baseball to an end and that the game could not continue until the issues
were resolved. This was not to be the case in 1994 and 1995. Again, the owners' view was that the players would not be able to resist the temptation to return
once they saw replacements playing in their positions. (This view of the situation in '94-'95-that is, that the strike would crumble when the players saw

5

Murray Chass, Owners Pull So Hard on Cap, They Can't See Strike in Their Path, N.Y.

TIMES, June 7, 1994, at B 11.
See generally NLRB v. Mackay, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
6
7

See generally NLRB v. Int'l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 408 (1972).
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their positions filled by replacements-appears to be held by a substantial number of owners to this very day!).
A peculiar element in the owners' position, however, was that they did
not intend to use their very best minor league players as replacements-i.e.,
those at the Triple A level-but rather would plan to bring in those below them.
This was predicated upon the view that eventually the players would return and
find it difficult to play with the replacements. Thus, the owners did not want to
bring in those players as replacements who would likely play with the incumbent team members at some future date because of concern that this would disrupt team harmony and effort.
The sultry and humid summer of 1994 in Washington D.C. moved on,
and telephone calls that I received in my NLRB office from Secretary of Labor,
Robert Reich, and others in the Department of Labor reflected their concern that
a strike might be imminent. I was queried about both the practice of collective
bargaining in baseball as well as the state of the law under the National Labor
Relations Act as written. The Clinton Administration wanted to do something,
but it did not know what to do.
The players set an August strike deadline and desultory negotiations
moved forward intermittently, but they languished right up until the eve of the
deadline. The dynamics between the parties and the American Ship Building v.
NLRB 8 holding (in which the Supreme Court held that, when motivated by an
attempt to time the stoppage at a point which will give the employer a bargaining advantage, lockouts are lawful under the NLRA) made the players feel that
if they did not strike well in advance of the season's end, the owners would unilaterally institute their own position on free agency during the winter months
and open the camps the following spring without them, relying, if necessary, on
the temporary replacements. This tactic is also lawful and was very much a part
of the 2004-05 hockey lockout dynamics. 9
The players felt that threatening a stoppage near or during the postseason playoffs, which brings owners most of their revenues, would give the
union the maximum amount of leverage. (This is why employers are able to use
the lockout to their bargaining advantage under American Ship Building by producing a stoppage when employee earnings will diminish at a time when there is
no employer incentive to settle.) For this reason, they viewed as misguided the
proposal that Secretary Reich made at Fenway Park in Boston during a game; he
wanted the parties to continue talking without resorting to warfare. On August
12, while I was en route to speaking engagements in Vancouver, British Colombia, and Seattle and Spokane, Washington, the players struck.
In fact, this aspect of the players' strategy misfired. The owners did not
back away from their positions, and the remainder of the 1994 season and the
8

380 U.S. 300 (1965).

See, e.g., John Wawrow, NHL asks union to disavow threats to punish agents, USA TODAY,
Mar. 29, 2005.
9
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World Series were cancelled-a result that the players did not seem to anticipate. This was the first time that the World Series had been cancelled since
1904, and it seemed unimaginable and unthinkable. But nonetheless, it was the
reality! The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service-the principal mediation office in the United States Government and entirely separate from the National Labor Relations Board-viewed it as a victory when, in early September,
they were able to get the players and the owners to simply go through the motions of having a meeting together. The Service was able to get the parties to
return to the bargaining table, the talks having been in recess since late August.
But that was about all that they were able to do. They were not able to get the
parties to discuss the issues or agree on anything.
After the season's collapse, negotiations continued but with little impetus until December when the owners sought to change the negotiating environment. Under American labor law, when labor and management have bargained
to the point of impasse or deadlock, employers may unilaterally institute either
the last offer or a package which is substantially equivalent to it when they have
bargained in good faith on so-called "mandatory subjects" relating directly to
wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
On December 20, Jerry McMorris, owner of the Colorado Rockies, had
an evening meeting with Don Fehr, the executive director of the Players Association and advised him that the owners needed a "significant drag" on players'
salaries-considerably more than what the union was offering. McMorris told
the mediator that he did see any way to reach agreement. Fehr stated that he did
not agree with McMorris's assessment.
Two days later, on December 22, the owners unilaterally implemented
their salary cap proposals and eliminated salary arbitration for certain players.
However, the owners' argument that there was deadlock or impasse was somewhat undermined by the fact that a series of union and owners' proposals had
been passed back and forth on both salary arbitration and free agency during the
previous week. Subsequently, the owners were to take the position that, though
clearly they had not bargained to impasse on salary arbitration, this was irrelevant because salary arbitration was not a mandatory subject affecting conditions
of employment within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act on
which they were obliged to bargain to impasse. (Grievance arbitration involving the interpretation of terms of the collective bargaining agreement is a mandatory subject of bargaining ° and interest arbitration, relating to new terms of
the collective agreement, is not"-the owners apparently viewed salary arbitration as more akin to the latter.).
t0

"Just as an employer must bargain with the representative of his employees on grievances so
must he about a method of resolving them." United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, 131
(1951).
i1
N.L.R.B. v. Columbus Printing Pressman Local 252, 543 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1976):

"We... hold that such a[n] [arbitration] clause is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, since its
effect on terms and conditions of employment during the contract period is at best remote." See

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I110

On that fateful day of December 22, the union, for the first time, presented a revised proposal that included a marginal tax plan that would address
profligate owners through taxation rather than a cap. The negotiations resumed.
Five hours later, however, the owners rejected the players' proposal, noting that,
while the new position represented a major philosophical shift for the union, a
more stringent tax was needed to alter salary patterns. When the players asked
for a counter proposal, the owners replied that they saw no reason to believe that
a counter proposal, within the same framework, would significantly lower the
salary brackets or that increasing the tax rates would help. They announced
that, in their view, the negotiations had reached an impasse. Accordingly, the
owners then unilaterally instituted or put into effect their position on both free
agency and salary arbitration.
The Major League Players Association filed unfair labor practices with
our regional office of the NLRB in New York City, alleging that the unilateral
declaration of an impasse and change in employment conditions by the owners
was a refusal to bargain in good faith and that impasse or deadlock had not in
fact been reached. Subsequently, the owners stated in proceedings before the
New York City office that they had changed the method of free agent negotiation so that it would proceed on a centralized basis rather than club by club. But
again, the issue was whether the system of free agent compensation could be
altered under these circumstances. If the clubs had been successful in centralizing the negotiations as they intended to do subsequent to their unilateral change
in working conditions, the response of the union might have been to dissolve
what the Supreme Court came to characterize in Brown v. ProFootball,Inc.12 as
multi-employer association bargaining. Though a union effort to organize the
players in 1946 was aimed at a club, the Pittsburgh Pirates, it is difficult to
imagine bargaining between the union and individual clubs given the mutual
dependency of all of them in a league situation, scheduling problems, etc. But
since the union could always assert its role to bargain on all matters as the exclusive bargaining representative under J. . Case Co. v. NLRB, 13 it could withdraw its delegation to individual players and ultimately withdraw from multiemployer bargaining-though not in the midst of collective bargaining itself. 14
In any event, as we shall see below, none of this and the legal issues associated
with it came to pass.
also Plumbers Local No. 387, 266 NLRB 30: "The Board... has consistently held that interest
arbitration, despite its arguable benefits, is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and that neither
party can compel the other to negotiate about a contract clause that would, in the event of new
contract negotiation disagreement, in effect substitute a third party as final decisionmaker of disputed contractual terms."
12
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
13
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
Retail Associates, Inc., 120 NLRB 388 (1958); Evening News Assn., 154 NLRB 1494
(1965) enfd. 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967). These rulings have been approved by the Supreme
Court in Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 402) (1982). Cf El Cerrito
Mill & Lumber Co., 316 NLRB 1005, 1006-07 (1995).
14
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Thus, the issue that was to come before the Board was whether proper
procedures had been followed. The popular perception, that the NLRB had substantively sided with the players, was different. As a Stanford baseball aide said
to me at an exhibition game at Sunken Diamond in late 2007 as we were discussing the Stanford slugger Joe Borchard's $5 million plus bonus when he
signed with the Chicago White Sox, "He has you to thank!" I reflected for a
moment and then replied to her, "Oh, because of the NLRB injunction?" She
nodded affirmatively.
Of course, in a vague and generalized way, one could say that this was
the result of our injunction, i.e., that the parties were able to bargain a series of
collective bargaining agreements which expanded free agency and may be said
to have created prosperity for draftees as well. But we were never to be involved in the rights or wrongs or efficacy of the players' and owners' substantive positions-under the American system of collective bargaining and labor
law, that is for the parties themselves and not for any government agency.
Again, the question was whether the parties had followed the proper procedures.
Another issue, which troubled many outside observers, was the law relating to bargaining itself. I was interviewed by radio stations which wondered
why, if the owners were prohibited from unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment without bargaining to impasse, there was not a similar obligation to be imposed upon the players before striking. Of course, we followed
the law as Congress had written it, and this is what it provided. Moreover, these
commentators failed to note that the owners had the right to lock out,1 5 to replace strikers 16 and perhaps even the players who were locked Out, 17 and to unilaterally change conditions subsequent to impasse.' 8 Essentially, the strike is
all that labor possesses. In any event, the Board had to follow the law as it was
written and interpret it as best we could on the basis of the facts of the baseball
dispute.
Now, in the wake of December 22, two fronts of negotiations began to
open. One was the litigation before the Board which was investigated by our
regional offices acting under the authority of the General Counsel under a bifurcated arrangement which exists in the agency. The General Counsel, like the
Board Members, is also a Presidential appointee, and is the prosecuting and
investigative independent arm of the Board. Though some of the newspapers
tended to confuse this-and the then incumbent General Counsel sought to confuse it as well-his office does not speak for the Board which retains final authority over all issues. The General Counsel makes argument and recommenda15
16

See generally American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
See generally NLRB v. Mackay, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).

See generally Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986); NLRB v. Brown Food Stores,
380 U.S. 278 (1965) (regarding lockouts in multi-employer bargaining contexts); Int'l Paper Co.,
319 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1995) enforcement denied, 114 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
18
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217
(1949); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
17
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tions to the Board Members. The matter could not go to the courts without the
Board's approval in one way or another. Again, the Board had the final say!
The second front became Congress and President Clinton's attempts to
resolve the matter. The previous August 2, while at the White House for a social function involving California Democrats, I chatted with President Clinton in
a receiving line. I remarked that Secretary of Labor Bob Reich and I had been
discussing the baseball negotiations. The President expressed dismay at the
prospect of a strike and said, "This is the best year in a long time," referring to
the home run records that might be set by such sluggers as Ken Griffey, Mark
McGwire, Matt Williams and others. He remarked that it was hard to have
sympathy for either side, given their wealth and "greed." As we parted he said
to me, "If you guys could resolve this, they would elect me president for life!"
(Subsequently when we did intervene effectively-some of the regional directors advised me that Secretary Reich had said that President Clinton was "jealous" of us and wished that he had settled the matter himself!.)
Now as the new year of '95 unfolded, some members of Congress began to focus on the question of whether the antitrust exemption provided by the
Supreme Court's holding in FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat ' League
of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs' 9 should be eliminated or revised, thus arguably
allowing players to sue the owners in federal district court for any restrictions
placed upon free agency. The White House flirted with the possibility of compulsory arbitration or some other third party mechanism to dissolve the labor
dispute, but the new Republican-controlled congress was against it.
In January, the White House appointed special mediator W.J. Usery, the
former Secretary of Labor in the Ford Administration. As he saw it, part of his
job was to recommend terms for an agreement. President Clinton announced
that the Administration was "turning up the heat" on the parties and was setting
a February 6 deadline for them to resolve matters themselves before government
intervention. Stating that "I want this thing settled," President Clinton summoned the players and owners to the White House a few days later.
Soon thereafter, it appeared as though mediator Usery might provide
recommendations that would take the form of legislation. But the newly arrived
Republican majority in Congress-this was the first few months of the heady
"Gingrich revolution" (Congressman Gingrich, the Speaker of House called it
"contract with America" but we called it the "contract on America")-pulled the
rug from under the White House and refused to support legislation through
which Usery's recommendations could be implemented.
Now the White House, faced with Republican reticence, went into retreat. Thus, both negotiations and government intervention in the form of legislation seemed to dissipate. Prospects for settlement were becoming far less
promising. Meanwhile, the Players Association had begun to display dissatis259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that the Sherman Anti-trust Act was not applicable to baseball). See generally Gould, supra note 2.
19
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faction with mediator Usery. This feeling arose out of distrust when Usery had
expressed displeasure with their position while at the White House. The Players
Association thought that Usery was siding with the owners.
As spring training was about to commence, the owners were ready to do
the unthinkable, i.e., to use replacement players, and Congress was signaling
that it would not intervene in any way, shape, or form. (Again, to compound
matters, the clubs did not plan to use their best minor league players at the Triple A level as replacements for the striking players because of their concern that
the difficulties such players would have with the Players Association, as they
subsequently progressed to the major league level, would pose a disruptive distraction for them.)
Into this vacuum stepped the NLRB. The players were attempting to
obtain support from the Board for an injunction against the unilateral changes
made on December 22. This was the very legal tactic that had failed in the 1981
strike, albeit in a different context which did not present any issue relating to an
employer obligation to open their books or to disclose financial information as
was the case in that dispute. This question of whether the Board could go to
federal district court, under a special procedure placed in the law in 1947, to
obtain an injunction against the changes in free agency and salary arbitration
became the key issue before us in March.20
I had a number of speaking engagements in the West and was in Los
Angeles on March 17, 1995, when the matter was submitted to the Board. By
the time I returned on March 22, two of the Board members, both Democrats,
had voted for an injunction and two of the others, both Republicans, had voted
against it. I was the man in the middle-a position not dissimilar to the one
which I occupied on a number of policy issues during my tenure where the two
Democrats and two Republicans were almost invariably aligned with labor and
management respectively.
I had not expressed a view on the question of whether the facts and law
authorized us to say that there was reasonable cause to believe that the owners
had not bargained in good faith and whether it was necessary to proceed into
federal district court without delay. These considerations were acknowledged to
be the applicable statutory prerequisites for an injunction of this kind. (My
Board, particularly during my first two years-but also throughout my entire
four and a half year tenure as Chairman-had issued the greatest number of
these injunctions in the history of the NLRB! From March of 1994 to March of
1998, the board authorized 292 injunctions, an average of 73 per year.21 From
March 1998 to January 2001, the Board only authorized an average of 58 per

20
21

29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2000).
For more on the climate during this period at the NLRB, see Gould, supra note 1, at Chapter

6.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. I110

year. This was a matter that quickly caught the attention of a hostile Republican Congress which frequently tried to come to the rescue of the defendant employers.)
When I returned to my Washington office early in the evening of March
22, my chief counsel, the late Bill Stewart (later to receive the most prestigious
award that a career employee can have from the White House 23), had left a note
for me that Usery had left a message that he would like the Board to delay its
decision in the baseball case and he would like me to call him. I did so between
8:00 and 8:30 that night.
Usery told me that he had had two "constructive days" with the parties
on a "confidential and fairly quiet" basis. He said that he was trying to establish
a meeting between then Acting Commissioner, Bud Selig, and Players Association Executive Director, Donald Fehr, for the following Saturday and Sunday,
and that these meetings might possibly run into Monday. Usery expressed concern to me that if we issued an authorization for an injunction in federal district
court we would run the risk of impeding negotiations and inflaming the relationship between the parties. Usery also said that he had spoken with fourteen owners and that there was a group that would meet with the Union to discuss a
framework or approach that he was recommending. He also told me that Gene
Orza, then General Counsel of the Players Association, had asked him not to
interfere with the unfair labor practice aspects of the case-though that is exactly what he was doing through the phone call.
I then called President Clinton's Counsel, Ab Mikva, previously on the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Mikva, after checking
with his sources, said that, while Usery is "technically still our mediator," nobody thought he could reach the players. "He has lost his influence," said
Mikva. I then advised the Democrats on the Board of this conversation, but
only told the Republicans about the Usery conversation and recommended to
both that we address Usery's recommendation, though I was personally disquieted by Mikva's assessment of the negotiations. The Board followed my recommendations.
But Usery's communication to us was soon revealed in the press, and
the Players Association was immediately critical of him. He turned around and
told the Association that I had called him and that he had not called me. Welcome to the world of Washington realpolitik!
I called Usery back about this and he agreed that, of course, he had
called me but did not deny his characterization of our conversation. Now the
weekend was coming and New York Times' sports columnist, Murray Chass,
Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, NLRB to all Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Utilization of Section 100) Proceedings (Aug. 9,
2002), availableat http://www.lawmemo.com/nlrb/gc02-07.
23
This happened in 1997 and was the first time in the history of the NLRB that any of its
employees had ever received this prestigious award, the President's Award for Distinguished
Federal Civilian Service. No one from the NLRB has received it since!
22
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reported that no negotiations had been scheduled for the weekend, and that the
future of the talks did not "appear promising. 24
On Friday afternoon, March 24, I went to both the General Counsel and
the other Board members, recommending that we meet on Sunday or Monday
morning and resolve this matter at that time. Ultimately, notwithstanding the
protestations of some Board Members, a meeting was set for Sunday afternoon
on March 26 and, after a very sleepless night, I walked from my condominium
on Pennsylvania Avenue to the Board's offices on L and 14th. As I arrived at
the office, television cameras were staked out in front of our building, and they
remained there as we deliberated on this matter. Indeed, so visible was the
Board at that time that television anchor David Brinkley commented on how
unusual it was for Government employees to work on the weekend (I had actually worked not only a large number of weekends but also the day of President
Nixon's funeral earlier in the year when all the air-conditioning was cut offl). A
nationally published cartoon had one character asking the other to refresh his
abbreviations (i.e., R.B.I.) and the abbreviations inrecollection about baseball
25
cluded the NLRB as well!
That day the Board voted on the question of whether we should seek an
injunction in the baseball dispute, and I cast the deciding vote to authorize an
injunction, 3-2. I decided, as a matter of law, that the injunction was appropriate. But this did not happen until countless and difficult controversies about
contacts with journalists and the question of whether the vote should be revealed. Most of the Board Members did not want to reveal anything or have
any contact with journalists-but I said that, in my capacity as Chairman, I
would not be muzzled. When I said this, one of the dissenting Republicans said
that he would reveal his opinion and when criticized (improperly in my view)
for doing this he said that I was responsible because I was against secrecy!
One Board Member, John Truesdale, who always kept a wet finger in
determine which way the wind was blowing, said that if the vote was
air
to
the
revealed this would be the "worst thing that could happen." These were the
words of a career Washington bureaucrat which I found difficult to believe or
accept because, in my view, the votes and opinions of Board members should
always be made known to the public notwithstanding any traditional custom that
Truesdale had relied upon to the contrary. After all, this was the public's business, and in my view, it should be revealed to the public! Indeed, after we made
a decision to publicize our views, the President's Counsel, Judge Mikva, commended us. For, as he said, it is always a good idea in "high visibility or important cases" for the Board to make its views and reasoning known.
Continuing, however, in the opposite vein, Truesdale excoriated me for
speaking with the press about our activities on the injunction, and, at times,
Murray Chass, Baseball Outlook Appears Gloomy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at B 11;
Murray Chass, Baseball's Unreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, A22.
Apr. 26, 1994, at B4.
Kevin Fagen, Drabble,PRINCE GEORGE'S J.,
25
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shouted in such a loud voice that he frightened the secretaries who were sitting
in the anteroom near my office. (Subsequent to my departure as Chairman in
1998, Truesdale became Chairman as a result of support provided by the segregationist friendly Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi!)
There was yet another controversy relating to publicity. A television
crew had asked us if they could bring television cameras into our agenda room
and do some filming, preferably while Board Members were present at the time
of the week-end vote. A majority eventually rejected the request. But before
the vote, Republican Board Member Cohen told my Chief Counsel that he could
not make up his mind on the camera question until he knew whether, if the television cameras didn't have access to our headquarters, they would come to the
Chairman's office. He said to my Chief, "I can't vote on this issue until I know
what the answer is."
My Chief Counsel replied that he had no idea what the television people
intended-and I didn't either. He gained the very distinct impression that
Cohen's overriding concern was insuring that no attention be given to the
Chairman's role in the dispute. If anyone was to receive attention, he appeared
to reason, it should be the Board as a whole. This almost puerile obsession and
resentment of the press' focus on me as Chairman manifested itself again and
again!
After the Board authorized the injunction over the strong dissent of the
two Republican members, our staff lawyers, as well as those of the Players Association, went before Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the federal district court in
New York City to request the injunction. Her opinion and order exceeded our
expectations. Since, as she found in agreement with a majority of our Board,
impasse had not been reached in the bargaining process and therefore the unilateral changes in work rules on free agency itself and salary arbitration were
unlawful, the parties were required to return to her court prior to the implementation of any new set of working conditions. This was an additional bonus
which made our victory complete in that it gave us considerable leverage should
the owners attempt to make a new change in working conditions at some point
down the road. The Board had been able to demonstrate to the public that the
labor law of the nation, however hobbled and deficient, could operate effectively and expeditiously.
Back on the playing field itself, the owners, having already used temporary replacements in spring training, had planned to use them in the regular season itself. As Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos stated, this would have
deprived the team's shortstop Cal Ripken of his chance to break Lou Gehrig's
consecutive game record. Luckily because of the Board's decision to seek injunctive relief and Judge Sotomayor's grant of it, this did not happen. Later in
the season, months after our successful injunction in New York, Ripken would
break the record and I was able to sit in Angelos' special box along with President Clinton, Vice-President Gore, and other dignitaries to celebrate this great
event!
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Meanwhile, in April, not long after Opening Day, I had traveled to Hofstra Law School in New York to speak at a conference celebrating the 100th
anniversary of Babe Ruth's birth. New York City labor arbitrator, Dean Eric
Schmertz, introduced me as the head of the agency that had brought about the
resumption of baseball. Earlier in the evening I had met Phil Rizzuto, the Yankees' shortstop when I was growing up in New Jersey. When he heard
Schmertz's introduction he exclaimed to me excitedly, "You didn't tell me that!
You didn't tell me that!" That Spring, the injunction which restored baseball
received a good deal of attention, most of it laudatory.
Meanwhile, the owners snarled angrily. They remained bitter with the
injunction long after it was issued, because they thought that if they had been
able to use replacements they would have been able to break the players' resolve
and dissipate their solidarity. Yet their forecast about player resolve was an old
one and had proved erroneous in every single dispute from 1972 onward. This
did not stop them from stating to me and others on a number of occasions after
the strike was concluded and a collective bargaining agreement had been negotiated, that, if we had not intervened, they could have imposed their terms on the
players because the picket line would have disappeared once a large number of
temporary replacements were going on the field.
Indeed, the owners were so angry with me that, two years later at the
50th anniversary of Jackie Robinson's rookie Brooklyn Dodger season, when
they held a party at the New York Mets' Shea Stadium where I and an entourage
of Clinton appointees arrived with the President, they sent word to a good friend
that I was not invited! (Nonetheless, I was able to enjoy myself at this important function and to meet Robinson's widow, Rachel Robinson.).
In any event, on April 2, 1995 in the wake of Judge Sotomayor's approval of our decision, the owners decided not to lock the players out, the players agreed to return to the field, and the parties agreed to start the season on
April 26. As it turned out, the Board's position was not only correct on the law,
but also, as the law contemplates, enhanced the collective bargaining process
and provided for a resumption of the baseball season itself. In the following
September, just as Sparky Anderson's Detroit Tigers pulled into town to play
the Orioles (Anderson had also been out of favor because of his opposition to
the replacement strategy) the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced
the district court's order.2 6 Meanwhile, in the wake of the injunction, the 1995
season ran its course and the Boston Red Sox finished first in the Eastern Division-a championship not recaptured again until 2007 when the Red Sox became world champions for the second time in four years!

26

Silverman v. Major League Baseball, 67 F.3d 1054 (1995).
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That summer of 1995 I was invited by Baltimore's Peter Angelos to
throw out the ceremonial first pitch when the Red Sox came to Camden Yards
in Baltimore. The Baltimore Sun commented that the owners "despised" me
more than they did Angelos, who had incurred their wrath because of his opposition to the owners' temporary replacement plan.27 But the Boston Globe also
had this to say:
A cloud of smoke from Boog Powell's tasty barbecue stand
hovered over right field in front of the brick warehouse. Last
Aug. 11, the last time these two teams played here, the smoke
was black and ominous, signaling the end of baseball because
of a work stoppage. Last night it was like a breath of fresh air.
• . baseball was alive and well, at least here, where these two
teams ended their seasons prematurely last year. There was a
touch of irony to Bill Gould, chairman of the National Labor
Relations Board whose decisions against the owners got the
game back on the field, throwing out the first pitch. [Pitcher
Roger] Clemens did the most effective throwing after that.28
Later in the year, I was able to avail myself of the peaceful relations created by our order and to get back to Fenway Park to see the Red Sox once again
and one of Tim Wakefield's many 1995 gems that he twirled in his best season
ever-and Luis Alicea turn the most acrobatically beautiful double play that one
can imagine, as the Red Sox marched toward an Eastern Division championship
only to be knocked off by the World Series-bound (soon to be American League
Champions) Cleveland Indians. Old friend, catcher Tony Pefias' home run in
Cleveland in the second game of the playoffs truly sank our ship. I took it all in
during the wee hours of the morning watching my TV in my Washington condominium. But, forever hopeful, I nonetheless jumped on a plane to see the
anticlimactic third game at Fenway in which Wakefield was beaten and the Sox
were eliminated.
During the following year, we were able to see more directly the policyrelevant fruits of the NLRB's work. In late 1996 after the completion of the
next season, the parties negotiated a comprehensive collective bargaining
agreement that resolved many of their outstanding differences. But, important
though it was, it was not simply the NLRB's restoration of the collective bargaining process that had produced the agreement. One of the owners who was
an outspoken "hawk" arguing for player salary restraint, Jerry Reinsdorf of the
Chicago White Sox, gave former Cleveland Indian slugger Albert Belle a record
27
28

GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 120.

Nick Cafardo, Sox Drop Orioles; Clemens on Target; Vaughn Hits No. 18, BOSTON GLOBE,

June 23, 1995, at 37.
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$55 million contract. He argued for a salary cap and decried the proposed collective bargaining agreement as inadequate! 29 Reinsdorf's adherence to this
double standard convinced a number of owners previously opposed to the
agreement to switch their vote and to ratify it, notwithstanding the absence of a
salary cap.
Almost a year to the date of the agreement in November, the Boston
Red Sox obtained Pedro Martinez from the Montreal Expos for two promising
pitchers. Martinez was to become one of the winningest pitchers for the Red
Sox during the seven years of his contract, which brought him the then unprecedented amount of $92 million. I was to see him in the opening series with the
Mariners in the spring of 1998-the same one in which "Mo" Vaughn smashed
a bases loaded homer to right in the bottom of the ninth to defeat the M's on the
Good Friday Fenway Opening Day itself. Pedro Perfecto, as I liked to call him,
had a winning percentage higher than any Red Sox pitcher with at least 100
decisions in the seven seasons with the Red Sox-760 for a 117-30 second record. When he was to bid the Red Sox farewell in late '04, bound for a $52
million, four-year contract with the New York Mets, it constituted perhaps the
most traumatic of the free agent divorces that the Red Sox had had-including
"Mo" Vaughn's departure to the California Angels and that of fireballing Roger
Clemens in '96 and the loss of "El Maestro" Luis Tiant in 1980 to the hated
Yankees.
But it was in 1997 that the '96 agreement was to establish the framework for the Bosox acquisition of Pedro and the new free agent environment
and to dim the unpleasant memories of the losses of Tiant, Clemens and, to assuage hurt from the one to come in 2000, "Mo" Vaughn. And it was NLRB
intervention that launched baseball on the road to uninterrupted peace between
labor and management and unprecedented prosperity, along with ever escalating
salaries!

Thomas Boswell, Reinsdorf Throws Owners The Curve, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1996, at B 1,
B3; Murray Chass, Owners to Meet Today On Labor Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at
B9; George Vecsey, In His Way, ReinsdorfMade Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at B9.
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